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Abstract 
Strong state control over the market economy is the fundamental feature of the Chinese economy. 
However, a series of significant legal reforms of enterprises during the recent years make the Chinese 
commercial law much more market-oriented than ever before. This essay briefly reviews the ongoing 
institutional development of enterprise laws in China and points out the comprehensive impact on 
Chinese economy in a foreseeable future.  
1. Introduction 
The institutional transplantation in transitional economies is experiencing a new age. The forty-year 
market-oriented legal reform with strong state control in China has reshaped the relationship between 
government and market participants. The strong state intervention in market economy in China makes 
it not surprising that the nature of the Chinese enterprise is not as ‘contractual’ as that in western 
countries, especially the commercial law in the common-law jurisdiction. In other words, to how large 
extent the law of enterprises in transitional China is market-oriented is still debatable. However, the 
ongoing legislative reforms in the area of business organization law in China have stepped towards a 
market-oriented business organization law system, which may provide law scholars and business 
lawyers with new expectation and understanding of the institutional features of the enterprises and 
financial investment in China. In this brief note, I will systematically review the recent developing 
trends in the law of business organizations in China, namely the mixed ownership reform of state-
owned corporations, liberalistic reform of company law and a market-friendly securities investment 
fund law during the recent years, and then point it out its potential development path in short future 
and its limitation as well. 
2. The On-going Mixed Ownership Reform of the SOEs in China  
Since the promulgation of the Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening 
Reforms (hereinafter ‘the Decision’)1 by the Central Committee of the China Communist Party (the 
Central Committee) in November 2013, a new wave of marketization reform of China’s SOEs have 
been launched, in which the political foundation and legitimacy for specific the mixed ownership 
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1 The Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (12th November 2013). 
reforms of the SOEs was established. As a fundamental guidance for the reform, it is clearly stated 
that ‘Diversified ownership integrated by State capital, collective capital and private capital is the 
prime method for materializing the basic economic system’2, the ‘Non-State shares will be allowed in 
State capital investment projects’3 and the ‘Mixed-ownership enterprises will be allowed to utilize 
employee stock ownership to form a vested community of capital owners and workers’ 4, which 
implicates that the private capital can invest in public-owned enterprises as the shareholders. 
Moreover, the Decision also points out that abolishing of unreasonable regulations on the non-public 
economy, eliminating hidden barriers and encouraging non-state enterprises to invest in or play a 
controlling role in mixed ownership enterprises5. From a perspective of legal reform, above policy has 
released a signal that the specific institutional transformations will be carried out in two dimensions, 
the one is enhancing the legal protection for private business and the other is legitimizing the 
marketization of the SOEs, both of which are expected to deeply influence the development of 
corporate governance of Chinese companies.    
In August 2015, Guidance Opinions on the Deepening of Reform of State-Owned Enterprises (‘the 
Guidance Opinion’)6 was passed the Central Committee and the State Council, which provides thirty 
specific guiding points for mixed ownership reform of China’s SOEs. According to this Guidance 
Opinion, the SOEs in China are classified into ‘commercial’ and ‘public interest’ SOEs with different 
economic and social functions respectively7. In the context of commercial SOEs that operate on a 
market basis, the private investors are allowed to invest in or even control the SOEs8, by which the 
economic efficiency of SOEs’ corporate governance can be improved. As for the ‘public interest’ 
SOEs providing that provide public services and goods for general populations, the ownership of such 
SOEs may still remain state-controlled, while in which the minority investors are allowed to invest9. 
Additionally, to mitigate the risks in social stability and people’s livelihood, the non-profitable 
institutions affiliated with SOEs such as public schools and hospitals are proposed to spin off, 
restructure or transfer their non-core sectors to private investors10.  
In regard of the capital structure reform of China’s SOEs, the Guidance opinion encourages private 
capital holders to apply equity subscription, convertible bonds and equity swaps to invest in SOEs for 
purpose of diversifying the ownership structure of the SOEs11. Moreover, the preferred share as 
another legal instrument for diversifying the ownership structure of SOEs has also been accepted by 
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China’s top decision makers12 and securities regulators13, by which the state can still remain the 
control over the SOEs in some special fields such as financial and media industries and at the mean 
time the private investors can guarantee their financial interests by exercising their preference rights 
in profit distribution and liquidation.  
3 The Company Law and Securities Law Reforms for Deregulating Private Economy 
Just as mentioned above, the development of the private economy is another dimension of social 
reform in contemporary China. The latest revision of the company law was completed in December 
2013 by the Standing   Committee   of   the   National   People's   Congress (SCNPC) and came into 
force since Mach 2014. Compared with the previous version of the Company Law (2005 Revision), 
the most remarkable highlight of the revised company law is the liberalization and deregulation of 
registering companies in China. For instance, the Company Law (2013 Revision) abolishes the paid-in 
capital registration system which required companies to file not only the registered capital but also 
paid-in capital with the State Administration for Industry and Commerce. The new Company Law 
only requires the registration of the ‘subscribed capital’14 and correspondingly the requirement to file 
a certified accountant’s verification of the capital is also removed15. Moreover, in consideration of the 
convenience for the establishers of small enterprises, especially those technical innovation start-ups, 
the new Company Law cancels minimum capital threshold for establishing a company with limited 
liability (including the one-member limited liability company) 16. In addition to the relaxation of 
capital registration, the requirement that no less than 30% of the registered capital of a company with 
limited liability must be in the form of cash has no longer applied, the shareholders currently are 
entitled more freedom of choosing different types of assets including cash, physical objects, 
intellectual property and land use rights as their contribution17 and in terms of the timeframe for 
completing the capital contribution, the previous two-year deadline within which the complete 
contribution must be made, is also removed18. Overall, the new Company Law of PRC provides more 
opportunities for entrepreneurs which will make the market mechanism more important in China’s 
economy. As a result, at least for non-state companies, the market of managers may play a more 
significant role in rebuilding the corporate governance structure in Chinese companies.  
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In respect of the China’s capital markets, for meeting private-owned companies’ financing demand, 
liberalization of listing system in the PRC securities market is also proposed and carried out in 
process. According to the current Securities Law (2014 Revision), any IPO application on China’s 
domestic stock exchanges will not be allowed, unless it is approved by China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC)19. With the development of non-state economy during recent years, currently the 
innovative business and e-commerce have become the new pushers of China’s economy, however, 
due to the inadequate cash flow and high risk of business failure, only very few small enterprises can 
successfully apply the loans from commercial banks or meet the strict fiscal requirement of listing on 
China’s main board of stock exchanges20, which has serious impeded the development of China’s 
economy especially the cutting edge technical industry. It can be imaged that the deregulation of 
listing requirement to the private companies would play a positive role in encouraging the developing 
non-state companies and improving the equality in China’s capital market.  
As a response to such plight, the reform of China’s listing rules from ‘approval system’ to 
‘registration system’ is being carried out by the legislator. In 2015 the amendment of the Securities 
Law has been proposed and launched by the SCNPC, in which the two following deregulating 
approaches are to be highlighted and expected to come into force in latest legal reform21. Firstly, it is 
proposed to entitle the compliance approval power to the stock exchanges, the CSRC’s approval 
power should be removed; what’s more, the requirement of the applicant’s profitability record during 
the latest three fiscal years is recommended to be cancelled, as the law should leave more freedom for 
market participants to independently judge the risks, prospect and profitability of a given company, by 
which the competition mechanism can be fully promoted 22 . Secondly, the significance of a 
candidate’s ‘continuous profitability’ should be diluted in examining a candidate’s listing 
qualification. In contrast, the quality of information disclosure and honesty and integrity of not only 
the candidate company but also its management layer should be investigated more strictly by the stock 
exchanges23. The CSRC will then play a pivotal role in regulating, supervising and sanctioning the 
listed companies of PRC stock markets after their IPOs, through which public investors’ interests will 
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be continuously guaranteed and protected, but at the meantime, the market selection mechanism will 
keep the primary position in China’s securities regulation24.   
4 The Investment Fund Law Reforms for Developing Institutional Investors  
As the theme which has been widely accepted that the primary problem in China’s corporate 
governance is the over-concentrated ownership structure in both the SOEs 25  and the non-state 
enterprises26. In terms of diluting the state control in SOE’s corporate governance, the development of 
institutional investors in China also must be strikingly important. Since the Law of Securities 
Investment Funds27 was revised in December 2012, the privately-held investment funds have been 
officially regulated by the CSRC, which means that the investors of hedge funds are better protected 
by Chinese law. Later on, since the promulgation of the Interim Measures for the Supervision and 
Administration of Privately-Raised Investment Funds (the Interim Measures 2014) in August 2014, 
according  to which private equity and venture capital investment funds have also been uniformly 
regulated by the CSRC28. Last but not the least, the Asset Management Association of China (AMAC) 
founded in June 2012 is also accepted by CSRC the as the self-regulatory institution for investment 
funds on a national level29 and all the fund managers are required to comply with the self-disciplinary 
rules issued by the AMAC, otherwise the AMAC has the power to impose reputational sanction on 
the managers of private investment funds30.  
 
Against such a background, institutional investors especially the PE/VC and hedge funds are 
encouraged to widely invest in the restructuring projects of SOEs. In such a way, the state’s 
dominating status in SOE’s shareholdings can be substantively diluted, through which the state 
shareholders’ monopolistic power of nominating directors of senior managers of SOEs can be 
reduced31. As a result, the interest pattern in corporate governance structure of China’s SOEs will be 
more balanced and the protection for non-state shareholders will be enhanced.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
                                                          
24 ibid. 
25 Jean Jacques du Plessis et al, Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (2nd edn, Cambridge 
University Press 2011) 396.  
26 Qilin Su, Family Control, PE Investment and Corporate Governance of Private Listed Firm (Economic 
Science Press 2013) 76. 
27 The Law of Securities Investment Funds of PRC (2012 Revision) < 
http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Gid=191978> accessed 17 February 2018. 
28 CSRC, Interim Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Privately-Raised Investment Funds 
(2014).  
< http://www.amac.org.cn/cms/article/preview?ID=386993> accessed 17 February 2018. 
29 According to s7 of the Interim Measures (2014), all the private investment funds raised in PRC must be 
registered with the AMAC.    
30 ibid, s29(2). 
31 Hongliang Zheng, ‘Corporate Governance Theories and the Reform of China’s SOEs’ (1998) 10 Economic 
Research Journal 20, 25-26. 
Since the first company law was promulgated in 1993, a series of market-oriented reforms of 
commercial organization laws in China have been carried out continuously. Even though the 
effectiveness of the present-day reform of Chinese SOEs or capital markets is still not clear and of 
course, the political nepotism may still impede the marketization of Chinese economy, the unbalanced 
economic structure and serious corruption in the SOEs has pushed the authority to restrict the 
monopolistic status of state-owned enterprises and state control over private economy substantively. 
Against such a complex social background, China may provide comparative law scholars with a 
valuable opportunity to observe how the state control over the transitional economy may essentially 
change the economic function of business organizations.  
